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INTRODUCTION. 1
In Democracy in America,  Alexis de Tocqueville argues that passions for both equality and liberty
constitute the chief attributes of liberal democracy. 2  In the same century, Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels –followed by Lenin in the 20th century– contend that history is chiefly characterized by the
conflict  between those  who  own the  means  of  productions  and  those  who  don’t  –those  who
produce. 3  In Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) and in On the Genealogy of Morals (OGM), Friedrich
Nietzsche describes the whole of history as a permanent bipolarity between the strong –committed to
the master morality of good vs. bad– and the weak –committed to the slave morality of good vs.
evil. 4  Michael Oakeshott, in The Politics of Faith and The Politics of Scepticism, suggests that,
since the fifteenth century, modern politics can be characterized by two –logically opposite and yet
practically complementary– styles of politics: the politics of faith and the politics of scepticism. 5
Although they disagree on the characterization of the poles themselves, all four philosophers describe
politics as a bipolarity: a dynamic between two poles. 6  In this paper, I shall attempt to describe
–and then reflect on– the dynamics of bipolarity in these four major works of political theory. Six sets
of questions inform the essay. 7  First, was there ever a time in which the political poles identified by
the author were either nonexistent or different from the currently predominant or ultimate ones? If so,
then why and what were the characteristics of that time? Second, what characterizes the political
poles? Are the apparent poles more complicated than what meets the eye upon a first reading? Does
the author reveal dimensions, levels, or different incarnations of the poles, or in fact more than two
poles? Third, are the characteristics of the poles altered in any way by either political actors, or by
way of their confrontation or interaction with one another? If so, how? If not, then why not? Fourth,
does the identified bipolarity spontaneously create a political equilibrium or evolve into another, or is
intervention required  to  produce  an equilibrium or  evolution?  Fifth,  if  the  latter,  does  the  author
recommend such intervention? Does the author  give a normative teaching or assess the identified
poles? Sixth, is the bipolarity theory valid? Does it accurately describe politics?
The paper opens with the discussion of the first two sets of questions –i.e. the characterization of
politics by Tocqueville, Marx, Nietzsche, and Oakeshott. The second section focuses on the intricate
dynamics between the poles and on the mediation occurring between them –i.e. the third and fourth
sets  of  questions.  The  fifth sets  of  question –i.e.  whether  the  author  gives  a  descriptive  or  a
normative teaching– informs the third section of  the paper.  In the conclusion,  I  attempt  to offer a
personal  view  to  the  final  question –i.e.  the validity  of  the bipolarity  theory  offered  by  the  four
philosophers– and try to answer it in the Belgian federal context.
THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE POLES.
According to  Tocqueville,  men’s  passions for  both equality  and liberty  chiefly  characterize liberal
democracy. Yet, he points out the tension between the two poles: where there is liberty, inequality
results, indicating inequality among men; by contrast,  where equality is enforced, mediocrity rather
than excellence results. 8  To figure out  why democracy was working more successfully  in the
United States than in France is the rationale of Democracy in America. Tocqueville opens his book
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with a dramatic declaration: “among the new objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the
United States,  none struck my eye more vividly that  the equality of  conditions.” 9  Thus,  after  a
nine-month trip in the United States, Tocqueville claims that, although liberty and equality are inherent
to  democracy,  equality  –meaning  equality  of  conditions–  predominantly  characterizes  modern
democracy. Equality has a momentum since men are driven by a passion for equality. Nevertheless,
this predominant passion for equality threatens the other facet of democracy: freedom. Therefore,
liberty  needs  to  be  maintained  (or  introduced)  in  order  to  counter-act  this  soft  despotism  of
equality. 10  In addition to this main bipolarity between equality and liberty, Tocqueville observes the
successful incorporation, in the United States, “of two perfectly distinct elements that elsewhere have
often made war with each other”: the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom (i.e. moral satisfaction
versus material well being). 11
In contrast to Tocqueville whose poles are tendencies, Marx defines his poles in material terms. The
whole of history can be characterized by a struggle between, on the one hand, those who own the
means of production and, on the other hand, those who don’t (and therefore, in order to survive need
to work for the former). 12  The concept of dialectical materialism is helpful to apprehend Marx’s
thought. The phrase dialectical materialism was actually coined by Hegel. According to him, history
progresses dialectically –i.e. by way of internal contradictions: thesis-antithesis-synthesis– and history
is shaped by ideology –i.e. either religious or political ideas. 13  Borrowing this phrase from Hegel,
in German Ideology, Marx gives the concept of dialectical materialism a particular emphasis. Although
he agrees on the dialectical progression of history (by way of a clash between classes which leads to
the  next  stage  of  history  through  revolutions),  Marx  denounces  the  notion  that  ideas  exist
independently  of  the material world.  Indeed,  material conditions shape ideas and men’s conduct.
Human  beings  are  products  of  their  environment,  especially  their  material  environment. 14
Therefore,  Marx argues  that  “consciousness  does  not  determine  life,  but  rather  life  determines
consciousness.” 15
What’s more, the modes of production generate a superstructure which includes religion, morality, the
conception of the private and the public, the laws of classical economics, 16  and marriage 17  as
well as political institutions. In a circular mechanism, the superstructure promotes and perpetuates the
repartition of the modes of production. This material world generates an economic system in which
human beings participate either as owners of the means of production or as producers. 18  Marx
adds that “the division of labor only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material
and mental labor appears.” 19  Furthermore, “the greatest division of material and mental labor is
the separation of  town and country.” 20  Therefore,  a modification of  the material conditions will
modify both owners and workers’ consciousness. This change will free everyone from their state of
alienation.
Similar to Marx, Nietzsche characterizes his poles in terms of two opposite groups. Yet, whereas the
former  describes  the  two  poles  in  material  terms,  the  latter  identifies  moral  commitment  as
fundamental  to  politics.  In On the Genealogy of  Morals  and Beyond Good and  Evil,  Nietzsche
endeavors to expose the true nature of man through the course of history: the will to power, “which is
after all the will to life,” 21  is the essence of man. Indeed, “life itself is essentially appropriation,
injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker.” 22  Hence, Nietzsche characterizes the whole of
history as a permanent  bipolarity of  the strong vs.  the weak:  that  is  to say the world is divided
between those who are strong and those who are weak, simply defined by the extent to which in their
nature they have the disposition to be master or slave. 23  Moreover, must men not only will but
also create values. Therefore, the permanent bipolarity of strong vs. weak generates two competing
value-systems, i.e. two historical bipolarities. On the one hand, the strong generate a specific moral
system: the master morality of good vs. bad. On the other hand, in reaction to the former bipolarity,
the weak have developed their own value-system: the slave morality of good vs. evil.
Oakeshott,  unlike  Nietzsche,  focuses  not  on the  individual level  but  rather  on the  political  level.
According to him, ever since the fifteenth century, European modern politics can be characterized by
two –logically opposite and yet practically complementary– styles of politics: the politics of faith and
the politics of scepticism. Since then, they have coexisted and have manifested themselves in practice
(political action and activity),  talk (political discourse),  and writing (political philosophy). 24  This
characterization of modern politics as a “continuous scale” 25  linking two poles is comprehensive:
European politics has moved between these two poles for the last five hundred years.
On the one hand, “in the politics of faith,” explains Oakeshott, “the activity of governing is understood
to be in the service of human perfection; perfection itself is understood to be a mundane condition of
human circumstances;  and  the  achievement  of  perfection is  understood  to  depend upon human
effort.” 26  Thus, an omnipotent government is needed in order to direct the activities of its subjects,
“either  so that  they contribute to the improvements which in turn converge upon perfection,  or (in
another version) so that they conform to the pattern imposed.” 27  On the other hand, the politics of
scepticism “has its roots either in the radical belief that human perfection is an illusion, or in the less
radical belief that we know too little about the conditions of human perfection for it  too be wise to
concentrate our energies in a single direction.” 28  Therefore, the office of government is to maintain
arrangements, the “superficial order,” 29  within which every citizen can safely pursue its own end.
To  sum up,  the  four  philosophers  describe  politics  in  terms  of  two  opposing  tendencies  (for
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Tocqueville), groups (for Marx and for Nietzsche), and dispositions (for Oakeshott). Nonetheless, their
historical perspectives differ widely: while Marx and Nietzsche endeavor to characterize the whole of
history, Oakeshott studies the last five hundred years, and Tocqueville starts with the American and
French Revolutions.  Considering the purpose of  the paper  –describing and reflecting on the four
bipolarity theories– it is worth exploring these differences.
Tocqueville does not describe politics in terms of philosophical poles justified by reason but rather in
terms of political poles. These poles are not eternal but historical. According to him, the American and
French Revolutions  have given birth to  the  liberal  democracy  which is  uniquely  characterized  by
demands for  both liberty and equality.  In fact,  this two major  events of  the 18th century are the
consequence of the democratic revolution which started with the demand for equality in the eleventh
century A.D. 30  Foremost, this democratic revolution is not a mere accident: it is inevitable, it is “an
accomplished fact.” 31
Oakeshott, like Tocqueville, is concerned only with modern politics and not with the whole of history.
Modern politics,  for  Oakeshott,  are “those habits and manners  of  political conduct  and reflection
which began to emerge in the fifteenth century and to which our current habits and manners are joined
by an unbroken pedigree.” 32  Moreover,  Oakeshott  focuses on the modern politics of  Western
Europe, and in particular on British politics because that is where the character of modern politics was
born and bred.
Foremost,  the poles  in both philosophers’  political  theory  intrinsically  complement  each other.  In
Tocqueville, equality and liberty are the two facets of the political life; neither liberty nor equality exists
on its own. Likewise, in Oakeshott, politics are more or less influenced by both the politics of faith and
the politics of scepticism: 33  “they are … the ‘charges’ of the poles of our political activity … and
our political activity has been at  all times … the resultant  of  both these pulls and not  merely the
consequence of one.” 34  Yet, in each theory, one pole seems to take ascendance over the other:
equality over liberty, the politics of faith over the politics of scepticism. This état de fait is not without
danger. For instance, Tocqueville argues that the passion for equality shall lead to mediocrity and to,
even more dangerous, the tyranny of the majority. Oakeshott is very afraid of the predominance of
the politics of faith, since if pursued exclusively, it shall ultimately lead to totalitarianism. 35  Hence,
practically,  between two  types  of  government,  Oakeshott  prefers  the  civil  association over  the
enterprise association. Indeed, the former establishes an association that tries to maintain a certain
unity while establishing proper distances between its members –i.e. the politics of scepticism. The
latter presupposes a single, unifying purpose for all its members –i.e. the politics of faith. 36
The very beginning of the history of man notwithstanding, 37  Marx’s theory comprehends the whole
of  history.  History is characterized by the hostile antagonism between classes over the means of
production which leads to the next stage by way of revolution. In the economy of Antiquity, masters
oppressed slaves through coercion. A few centuries later, in feudal economy, lords oppressed serfs
through responsibility. 38  On the ruins of the feudal system, the capitalist economy has generated
the  clash between employers  and  employees  –also  referred  to  as  bourgeois  vs.  proletarians–
mediated  by  cash.  In this  capitalist  society,  everyone  –including  capitalists  themselves–  has  a
defective consciousness because it is a product of the superstructure. 39  Men are historical beings
shaped  by  the  economic  system  in  which they  participate  either  as  owners  of  the  means  of
productions or not. Moreover, whether any individual is among the owners or the workers is simply a
matter of luck. For that reason, the economy should neither reward nor punish someone for attributes
which he inherited by accident.  Above all,  both the proletarians and bourgeois are victims of  the
capitalist  system:  everyone is  alienated. 40  This  unbearable situation will  inevitably  lead to  the
revolution of the proletariat which will establish a communist regime. 41
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche scrutinizes the whole of history to capture and convey the
human soul  as  well  as  the  morality  it  has  generated.  To  understand  the  value  of  morality,  he
undertakes to dig into the origin of our morality, of our moral prejudices; that is his genealogy. 42
Doing so, he offers a poetical history rather than a linear chronology of events. 43  Nietzsche claims
that  he has a “historical spirit,” 44  which is suprahistorical and transcultural.  As a physician of
culture, he offers a diagnosis of culture for which he shall recommend a prescription –to be discussed
below. In fact, Nietzsche writes a polemic, as indicated by the subtitle of his work: a polemic against
“the ever spreading morality of pity,” 45  which has come to prevail. Indeed, the struggle between
the two competing moral systems has animated the last two thousand years of history. Since the
origin of history, man has strived “to grow, spread, seize, become predominant” 46  for man is living
and life “simply is  will  to power.” 47  This  nature of  man and the differences in value,  physical
strength,  and  the  strength of  the  soul  explain the  main characteristic  of  aristocratic  society:  a
hierarchy led by a few noble men. 48  These noble martial aristocrats (the strong) created a “pathos
of distance” 49  with the rest  of mankind,  i.e.  the weak, which they despised. Mere indifference
characterized the attitude of the noble men towards the weak. This ruling group defined itself as the
“good,”  defining  the  common people  by  default  –or  better,  by  indifference–  as  the  “bad;”  thus
appeared  the  master  morality:  the  opposition  between good  and  bad,  or  between noble  and
contemptible. 50  Yet, Nietzsche adds immediately “in all the higher and more mixed cultures there
also  appear  attempts  at  mediation  between  these  two  moralities,  and  yet  more  often  the
interpenetration and mutual misunderstanding of both, and at times they occur directly alongside each
other –even in the same human being, within a single soul.” 51
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Both Marx and Nietzsche characterize the whole of  history and describe how their  bipolarity has
evolved throughout the centuries. According to Marx, man’s life changed dramatically when the notion
of private property was introduced. Since then, history has been a succession of clashes between
classes,  punctuated  from  time  to  time  by  a  revolution.  For  Nietzsche,  although noble  martial
aristocrats had dominated the world for several centuries, after a two-thousand year struggle, the
weak  and  their  morality  finally  prevailed.  Furthermore,  both philosophers  are  very  interested  in
understanding the true nature of man as well as how to liberate him. Chiefly, unlike Tocqueville and
Oakeshott, Marx and Nietzsche do not contend that the poles intrinsically complement each other and
that there should be an equilibrium between them. Rather, they maintain that one has triumphed –the
weak in Nietzsche (even though the bipolarity between the strong and the weak is permanent)– or
that one will eventually triumph –the proletariat in Marx. This victory will lead to the abolition of the
poles, tout simplement.
THE MEDIATION BETWEEN THE POLES.
In his work, Tocqueville “wishe[s] to expose to broad daylight the perils that equality brings to human
independence” because he “firmly believe[s] that these perils are the most formidable as well as the
least foreseen of all those that the future holds.” But he does not “believe them insurmountable.” 52
As he proceeds, the author of Democracy in America describes the features of American democracy
that  oppose  (i.e.  mediate)  the  great  force  of  equality.  These  features  are  the  structure  of  the
American government (for instance, the division of power) and the democratic institutions (the federal
form, the township institutions, and the judicial power –especially the lawyers and the juries). 53
These measures –which Tocqueville found in the United States– are needed to preserve freedom;
otherwise people become passive and, therefore, eventually lose their liberty.
Despite these measures, Tocqueville strongly fears a more hidden as well as greater danger: the
tyranny of the majority. 54  Indeed, he observes that his contemporaries love equality so much that
they are ready to sacrifice liberty: “they want equality in freedom, and if they cannot get it, they still
want  it  in  slavery.” 55  Yet,  in  the  United  States,  in  addition  to  the  democratic  institutions,
associations and the press mitigate the danger of equality. Before American independence, “township
government,  that fertile seed of free institutions, had already entered profoundly” the habits of the
inhabitants of the New World. 56  Both juries and lawyers contribute, via a process of interaction, to
educate the citizens about  their  rights and the laws. 57  Moreover,  the legal world emphasizes
forms  and  order  which demarcate  boundaries  and  thus,  protect  freedom.  Above  all,  Tocqueville
forcefully maintains that associations (from the smallest club to the main political parties) combat the
threat  posed  by  the  excessive  passion  for  equality.  The  art  of  association  is  the  “mother
science.” 58  The associations acting as intermediary powers compensate for the absence of an
aristocracy. 59  Tocqueville  notes  that,  in the  heart  of  democratic  America,  lawyers  show  an
aristocratic inclination, 60  that  parties have an aristocratic foundation, 61  and that  “when plain
citizens  associate,  they  can constitute  very  opulent,  very  strong  beings  –in a  word,  aristocratic
persons.” 62  Furthermore, they prepare citizens to participate politically and keep them aware of
the res publica, thereby keeping freedom alive. Last but not least, the press not only informs people
but  also persuades and fosters debates:  “the press is the democratic instrument  of  freedom par
excellence,”  which fights  the  tyranny  of  public  opinion. 63  All  these  features  that  Tocqueville
discovered while visiting America enervate the tension between the two attributes of democracy.
Like Tocqueville, Marx encourages the art of association. However, unlike Tocqueville, he argues for
a  specific  association,  that  is  the  association  of  the  proletarians.  To  foster  this  association,
communists play a crucial role. Communists, who were once bourgeois, 64  are needed to instruct
and educate proletarians about why they are miserable and how the system wants to blind them.
Thus, communists raise the consciousness of the workers. They encourage the proletarians to seize
the  means  of  production,  to  take  over  the  private  institutions;  this  will  eventually  lead  to
communism. 65
Marx’s revolutionary idealism and advocacy for the use of violence notwithstanding, American lawyers
for Tocqueville and communists for Marx share a common function of raising awareness among their
fellow countrymen (for the former) and among the proletarians (for the latter). In other words, they
play a major  role in the mediation of  their  respective bipolarities.  What’s more,  both lawyers and
communists show an aristocratic inclination.  According to Tocqueville,  the lawyers “form a sort  of
privileged class among persons of intelligence” and “[a]dd to this that they naturally form a body.”
Tocqueville concludes: “hidden at the bottom of the souls of lawyers one therefore finds a part of the
tastes and habits of aristocracy.” 66  If the notion of aristocratic inclination is not understood sensu
stricto but rather as an inclination to pursue an ideal, communists appear to be aristocratic by their
function of raising the consciousness of the proletarians.
Nonetheless,  the intervention of  the communists in the class struggle seems to be in tension with
Marx’s characterization of  history. On the one hand, Marx argues that  communists are needed to
raise the consciousness of the workers. But, on the other hand, he presents history as spontaneous.
One stage of history follows the previous stage without deliberate action since each stage generates
internal  contradictions  that  the  particular  economic  conditions  of  that  stage  cannot  address.
Therefore, Marx contends that these contradictions lead to the collapse of the stage. A new economy
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is founded upon the ruins of the previous. For instance, in the capitalist economy, the production is so
efficient that economy produces more than what the consumers can buy (for the wages are not high
enough to pay for the goods and moreover, workers do not have enough time). Hence, capitalists try
to deal with this situation by, for example, offering credits, i.e. they try to generate demand for the
goods being produced. Finally, since supply exceeds demand, workers are laid off. It is followed by a
downsizing of the economy which has consequences also for the members of the bourgeoisie who,
after  having  lost  their  jobs,  become  part  of  the  proletariat.  This  increasingly  difficult  situation
encourages the proletariat to mobilize and eventually engage in a revolution. In short, material forces
spontaneously move history.
In The State  and Revolution,  Lenin gives  more details  about  the intervention:  “by  educating the
workers’ party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat which is capable of assuming power
and leading the whole people to socialism, of directing and organizing the new order,  of  being the
teacher,  guide and leader of  all the toiling and exploited in the task of building up their social life
without  the  bourgeoisie  and against  the bourgeoisie.” 67  Thus,  communists  need to  guide  the
proletariat to the revolution. Foremost, Lenin considers a violent revolution inevitable: “the substitution
of the proletarian for the bourgeois state is impossible without a violent revolution.” 68  The state is
the organ of domination par excellence. The inherent contradictions of the capitalist system need to
be controlled and suppressed: the state is the result and the function of these inherent contradictions.
Marx’s communists share a common feature with Nietzsche’s priestly aristocrats: both groups were
once part of the group that they are now fighting. Whereas communists were once bourgeois, priestly
aristocrats separated themselves from the martial noble aristocrats. According to Nietzsche, the Jews
are in fact the priestly aristocrats. As any human beings, the Jews strived to create their own values
and will themselves to power. To do so, nonetheless, they used their canniness (their intellect) instead
of physical strength. 69  Out of ressentiment (Jews lacked vigor and physical strength), they dared
“to invert the aristocratic value-equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of
God) …, saying ‘the wretched alone are the good, the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good …
and you, the powerful and noble, are on the contrary the evil…’ … the Jews there beg[an] the slave
revolt in morality.” 70
According to Nietzsche, in order to get this inversion of morality accepted, the Jews cunningly utilized
one of  them,  Jesus of  Nazareth.  By the crucifixion of  Jesus Christ,  the Jews wanted to appear
senseless and cruel. Therefore, their attitude provoked, as a reaction, a tide of compassion; however,
generating  such an expression of  ressentiment  was  actually  the  raison  d’être  of  Jesus  Christ’s
crucifixion by the Jews in order to promote their –slave– morality and to stress the evilness of the
master morality. 71  Following this cunning plot (or “the secret black art  of  truly grand politics of
revenge” 72 ), the oppressed masses, explains Nietzsche, responded to Christianity because they
were seeking meaning for life which was offered by the slave mentality embodied by Jesus Christ.
Thus, human beings transformed from being noble men, characterized by power and willingness, to
becoming  bonhommes,  characterized  by  good  nature  and  little  stupidity. 73  Finally,  after  two
millennia of rivalry, the slave morality has triumphed over the master morality. 74
Unlike Marx and Nietzsche who present their bipolarities in terms of  two groups of human beings,
Oakeshott offers a bipolarity between two dispositions, two styles of politics. The politics of faith and
the politics of scepticism are “the ‘charges’ of the poles of our political activity, each exerting a pull
which makes itself felt over the whole range of movement… they provide at once the limits and the
impetus of our political movement.” 75  Yet, Oakeshott contends that we need to “hold back from
the extremes;” 76  mediation is needed. The Character of the Trimmer that Oaksehott borrows from
Halifax endeavors to combine the two styles of politics; that is to keep the boat afloat. The Character
of the Trimmer is a doctrine of moderation. So, the opposition between the two politics “has been
mediated in practice.” 77
One could argue that moeurs, as described by Tocqueville in Democracy in America, play a similar
role of  mediation.  Indeed,  moeurs  or  habits of  the heart  fashion the character  of  Americans and
transform them into citizens. In this regard, Tocqueville emphasizes the importance of the way that
religion shapes mores chiefly through the family:  “religion directs mores, and it  is in regulating the
family that it works to regulate the state,” especially, “it is woman who makes mores.” 78  Religion
inculcates habits of restraint which complement democracy: “these habits of restraint are to be found
in political society and singularly favor the tranquility of  the people as well as the longevity of the
institutions it has given itself.” 79  Indeed, in the United States, “the spirit of religion and the spirit of
freedom,  which elsewhere  “always  move  in contrary  directions,”  are  united  intimately  with one
another: they reigned together on the same soil.” 80  The complete separation of church and state
enables this peaceful union and above all, this separation ensures the stability of democracy. 81
DESCRIPTIVE OR NORMATIVE TEACHING?
The reading of Oakeshott’s essays shows a tension in his view of the function of political philosophy.
On the  one  hand,  political  philosophy  must  be  understood  as  “an explanatory,  not  a  practical,
activity.” 82  Philosophy clarifies the world in which we live or the assumptions that people make
when they undertake various activities.  In other  words, the activity of philosophy gives the key to
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understanding human activities in regard to their own pursuits, whereas the task of the government is
to keep the ship afloat. The philosopher cannot contribute to politics as such. Thus, strictly speaking,
philosophy is  not  relevant  for  political  practice:  the philosopher  ought  to  be disengaged and not
engaged in the political round. On the other hand, it seems that he admits that the very activity of
clarification does, at the end, shape our moral values. In The Politics of Faith and The Politics of
Scepticism, he exhorts –and helps– us to undertake the enterprise of clarifying the poles of political
activities. This enterprise can give us eventually some kind of illumination that can potentially guide us
in the political arena. Indeed, according to Oakeshott, once one understands the character of the two
poles,  one will  see the danger  of  pursuing one to  the  exclusion of  the other.  Therefore,  in the
contemporary world, since the politics of faith is dominant,  it  is our political role to emphasize the
importance of the politics of scepticism. 83
Similarly to the first interpretation of Oakeshott, Tocqueville does not present a blueprint. Rather, as a
student of the science of politics, he asks the question of the nature of politics, its features, and its
function. His answers are by no means theoretical, let alone ideological. However, he offers practical
(this is what politics is all about) prescriptive recommendations. Tocqueville, inspired by the American
experience, contends that moeurs or habits of the heart which shape democratic institutions as well
as civil society can best combat the threat of the tyranny of the majority –i.e. the negation of freedom.
In a realm of politics divided between demands of equality and demands of liberty, he argues for a
moderate  attitude  since  the  poles  are  the  two  fundamental  and  inherent  facets  of  democracy.
Oakeshott recommends the principle of moderation (the Character of the Trimmer), too –this is the
second interpretation of Oakeshott.
Nietzsche,  as a physician of  culture,  starts with a diagnosis of  the nature of  man.  As mentioned
above, he sees a permanent  bipolarity between the strong and the weak. Both groups developed
their  own distinct  moral  values.  Nonetheless,  the  priestly  aristocrats  have  succeeded  –after  a
two-thousand-year struggle– to invert the aristocratic equation. Upon the slave morality of good vs.
evil, Christianity has developed and brought the ascetic ideal. 84  Christianity posits God and what is
true is God; it is “the highest court of appeal.” 85  However, this preoccupation with truth –a will to
truth born in religion– has given birth to science which has paradoxically led to the death of God.
Indeed, science has given other explanations for the world and our existence, and thereby science
killed the ascetic ideal. The death of God has left man in a state of nihilism, a crisis of meaning 86
in which man can only will nothingness. 87  Therefore, in such an abyss, such a state of nausea,
Nietzsche encourages us to create our own values if  we want to continue to live; science,  on the
contrary, does not create values. 88  Nonetheless, the creation of values presupposes nihilism, i.e.
destroying  what  one  creates.  Thus,  living  a Nietzschean life  is  embracing  the  willingness  to  live
through an eternal recreation of what one creates. This is the opposite of a life of “promises keeping”
–which is a creation of Christianity. 89  Nietzsche urges man to tell a “genuine, resolute, ‘honest’
lie;” 90  that is a lie that acknowledges the death of God and that there is no true morality. Above
all, only strong men, who are very few, have the ability to lead such a Nietzschean life.
Nietzsche offers the reader a descriptive teaching –his genealogy of morals– as well as a normative
teaching –the Nietzschean value– creating life in order to overcome the state nausea caused by the
death of God. Likewise, Marx presents both a description and a prescription. The whole of history is
characterized by class conflicts. The current stage of history sees the conflict between the bourgeois
and the proletarians. Both groups suffer under capitalism; only communism will fulfill human beings.
Indeed, as “species beings,” human beings thrive only by way of interaction with one another. This
interaction truly satisfies us. 91  Communism as a system will fulfill us because we will realize our
desire for association through work with each other –and we will become socialized men. 92  To
establish such a system, according to Marx, there is only one solution: the communistic revolution.
Therefore, Marx and Engels conclude the Manifesto of the Communist Party with: “Let the ruling class
tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have
a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite!” 93
Yet, Marx remains vague about what  communism will be like since consciousness is a product of
historical change and cannot anticipate the future. Moreover, he is not willing to provide us with an
utopia –he does not want to be an utopian. However, in a short passage of The German Ideology,
Marx gives a glimpse of  what  communist  society would be:  “nobody has one exclusive sphere of
activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general
production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in
the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I  have a
mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.” 94
Lenin gives more details about the communist society. He distinguishes the first phase from the higher
phase –using Marx’s terms. During the first years (although he does not mention how long this phase
is  going  to  last),  society  still  bears  the  marks  of  the  old  society,  but  above  all  “the  means  of
production are no longer the private property of individuals. The means of production belong to the
whole of society.  Every member of  society,  performing a certain part  of  socially-necessary labor,
receives a certificate from society to the effect that he has done such and such an amount of work.
According to this certificate, he receives from the public warehouses … a corresponding quantity of
products. Deducting that proportion of labor which goes to the public fund, every worker, therefore,
receives from society as much as he has given it.” 95  Thus, a period of transition is needed in order
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to enable man’s consciousness to be reconstituted by the new environment –set by the revolution of
the proletariat. 96  Eventually, “the economic basis for the complete withering away of the state is
the high stage of development of communism in which the antithesis between mental and physical
labor disappears, that  is to say, when one of the principal sources of  modern social inequality …
disappears.” 97  Therefore, the communist society will be a classless society where everyone will
produce  according to  their  abilities  and receive according  to  their  needs.  Foremost,  as  species
beings, men will be entirely fulfilled 98  for men will be acting together.
CONCLUSIONS.
In  this  paper,  I  have  endeavored  to  describe  the  characterization  of  politics  by  four  major
philosophers. Although Tocqueville, Marx, Nietzsche, and Oakeshott understand politics in terms of a
bipolarity, they largely diverge on the characterization of the poles. Whereas Tocqueville argues that
passions  for  both equality  and  liberty  constitute  the  chief  attributes  of  liberal  democracy,  Marx
describes the whole of  history as a conflict  between two classes –the owners  of  the means of
production  and  the  workers–  which  is  culminating  in  a  clash  between the  bourgeois  and  the
proletarians.  Nietzsche  contends  that  history  is  chiefly  characterized  by  a  permanent  bipolarity
between the strong –committed to the master morality of good vs. bad– and the weak –committed to
the slave morality of good vs. evil.  Oakeshott  suggests that,  since the fifteenth century, European
modern politics have evolved between two poles: the politics of faith and the politics of scepticism.
What’s more, the bipolarity theories are in fact more complicated than what meets the eye upon a
first reading and, on the basis of their respective descriptive teaching, the four philosophers suggest a
normative teaching. While in Tocqueville and Oakeshott the poles intrinsically complement each other
and, thus, need to be mediated in order to avoid the ascendance of one over the other, in Marx and in
Nietzsche the tension between the poles leads eventually to the triumph of one of them. Moreover,
Nietzsche emphasizes the role of individuals in history. It is to each one of us to go through the state
of  nausea and  upon this  background of  nihilism to  create one’s  own values.  Marx predicts  that
communists  will  educate the proletarians and lead them to the communistic  revolution but  in the
broader context depicted by his historical materialism. Tocqueville believes that both institutions and
men mitigate the predominant passion for equality and therefore preserve freedom. Oakeshott does
not recommend an intervention per se, but rather he argues for moderation between the two poles of
politics.
To conclude tentatively,  one last question needs to be addressed: the validity question. I  consider
Oakeshott’s  bipolarity  between the politics  of  faith and the politics  of  scepticism to comprehend
Tocqueville’s,  Marx’s,  and  Nietzsche’s  characterization of  politics.  Although these  three  bipolarity
theories are valid and show, as described throughout the paper, an internal coherence, they can aptly
be read in the framework proposed by Oakeshott.
Tocqueville is a skeptic. 99  He is very much afraid of the passion for equality, which reflects the
politics of faith and may lead to the abolition of freedom. In a passage of Democracy in America,
cited above, 100  he observes that his contemporaries love equality so much that they are ready to
sacrifice liberty  even though it  leads to  slavery.  In order  to  avoid such an extreme,  Tocqueville
advocates the principle of moderation, especially at the local level. 101  In fact, the structure of the
American government and the democratic institutions (the federal form, the township institutions, and
the judicial power –especially the lawyers and the juries) as well as associations mitigate the faith-
driven passion for equality.
In contrast, Marx, Engels, and Lenin propose in their political philosophy a version of the politics of
faith. Since the material conditions shape us, we should strive to change our material environment.
This can only be done through a violent revolution which would establish first the dictatorship of the
proletariat  and then a communist regime. This is the only solution to man’s history which is chiefly
characterized by a conflict  between two classes. Since politics equal conflicts,  they argue that we
should  go  beyond  politics  and  thereby  conflicts  would  vanish. 102  To  do  so,  as  communists
themselves, they offer man a blue print with both theoretical and practical teachings. Foremost, they
encourage man to undertake an enterprise association which pursues a single, unifying purpose for all
its members. This is a reflection of the politics of faith.
Nietzsche’s philosophy is not political per se. Yet, he maintains that justice as well as all the social
conventions that currently prevail is a creation of the weak in order to protect them against the strong.
In contrast,  the strong do not  need any form of  government.  On this regard,  Nietzsche’s nihilism
appears to be an extreme form of  the politics of  scepticism.  To overcome this state of  nausea,
Nietzsche offers an individual solution by the endless (re)creation of  one’s own values.  Here is an
important interrogation raised by reading Nietzsche whether it is humanely possible to live the way he
asks us to live.
Above all,  can Oakeshott’s  bipolarity  theory  be helpful to  capture today’s  politics in general and
Belgian politics in particular? At first  sight,  in the Belgian political turmoil,  the bipolarity appears to
characterize chiefly the political dynamics. Moreover,  it  seems that both Flemish and Francophone
political parties need to mediate the tension between nationalist discourses advocating the division of
Cahier n°15 - Bipolarity in Alexis de Tocqueville’s, Karl Marx’s, Fried... http://popups.ulg.ac.be/csp/document.php?id=401&format=print
7 sur 11 7/07/2009 6:51
the  country  –politics  of  faith–  and  consensual  discourses  of  living  together  in a  federal  system
–politics  of  scepticism.  However,  a  closer  look  at  the  Belgian  federal  dynamics  disrupts  this
dichotomous vision of  Belgium. Indeed,  most of  the political actors show dispositions for  both the
politics of faith and the politics of scepticism. First of all, the main bipolarity –even though it should be
nuanced– of Belgium is to be found in the linguistic cleavage between Dutch-speaking and French-
speaking Belgians. On this basis, one cannot argue that one community comes closer to either the
politics of  faith or the politics of scepticism. In both communities,  which do not  form homogenous
entities, one can find marks of both politics. For instance, among the Francophones, the citizens who
support the return of the unitary state –as it was before 1970– seemed to stand on the side of the
politics of faith. On the other hand, those who argue for a federal state which accommodates the
Belgian diversity stand on the side of the politics of scepticism.  
Furthermore,  if  taken as  a  whole,  the  Belgian federal  dynamics  seem to  fit  in the  overarching
framework proposed by Oakeshott. It evolves between two poles or two main tensions which could
be  characterized  by  Oakeshott’s  politics  of  faith  and  politics  of  skepticism.  The  former  seeks
perfection or translated in Belgian terms there is a single best solution for the future of Belgium, be it
for some the independence of Flanders, for others the return of the unitary state. By contrast,  the
latter rejects any search of perfection but rather favors multiple ends and it is the role of government
to maintain a political structure which enables this diversity of goals. In the Belgian context, to some
extent, this position can take the form of a federal system which would let its components to follow
their  own will–  however,  it  appears  quickly  here  that  a  boundary  should  be set  up  somewhere
otherwise the diversity might break down the unity of the whole.
Finally, a pluralistic view of the society or of the political actors could help apprehend the complexity
of  social and political relationships.  If  a comprehensive bipolarity theory can be powerful since it
posits all political activity occurs in a dynamic between two poles, real politics reminds us everyday
that it is no so linear. It is the task of the political scientist to endeavor to apprehend this complex
multilinearity or, perhaps better, multipolarity.
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